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ABSTRACT 
 
Jennifer Kling: Everyone’s Got Something They Just Can’t Give Up: A Challenge to Feinberg’s 
Adherence to the Volenti Maxim 
(Under the direction of Gerald Postema) 
 
In this paper, I challenge Joel Feinberg’s in-principle unconditional adherence to the 
Volenti maxim, which states, roughly, that to he who consents, no wrong is done.  Given the 
resources available in his theory of when a community can legitimately use the criminal law 
to prohibit actions, it seems that Feinberg need not hold that a person’s consent always 
nullifies the wrong done to her. Through the lens of a particularly troubling case, I attempt 
to demonstrate that Feinberg can and should accept, given his prioritization of the doctrine 
of sovereign self-rule, that there are limits to consent’s ability to nullify wrongdoing. I 
conclude by showing that accepting limitations on the Volenti maxim is not only consistent 
with Feinberg’s theory, but actually enables his theory to consider a range of problematic 
cases in a fresh light. 
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I. Feinberg’s Theory 
 
In his four-volume work The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law, Joel Feinberg argues 
that the jurisdiction of the criminal law ought to be limited to the harm and offense 
principles.1 He writes that these two principles, “duly clarified and qualified, between them 
exhaust the class of good reasons for criminal prohibitions.”2 These principles provide the 
scope of our public morality; they pick out those actions that the community can legitimately 
prohibit via the use of the criminal law. Whether the community is justified in prohibiting, 
via the criminal law, all of the actions that fall under its jurisdiction is another matter; the 
crucial claim here is that the community’s jurisdiction is limited. In Feinberg’s hands, the 
harm and offense principles limit those actions that can legitimately be prohibited by the 
criminal law to those actions that have victims. A victim is one who has been wronged by 
another person, in the sense that her rights have been violated.3 So A wrongs B when A 
violates B’s rights: it is A’s violation of B’s rights that makes B a victim. As I understand 
Feinberg, for the community to have jurisdiction over some action, that is, for the 
community to have the moral standing to regulate that action via the criminal law, that 
                                                
1 The harm principle is that “the need to prevent harm to persons other than the actor is always a morally 
relevant reason in support of proposed state coercion.” Feinberg understands harms as wrongful (rights-
violating) setbacks of interests. The offense principle is that the need to “prevent hurt or offense (as opposed 
to injury or harm) to others” is always a morally relevant reason in support of proposed state coercion. 
Feinberg understands offenses as disliked mental states, such as repugnance, that are caused by the wrongful 
(rights-violating) conduct of others. Joel Feinberg, Harmless Wrongdoing (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1990), ix, also x-xix. 
 
2 Harmless Wrongdoing, xix. Feinberg refers to this claim as “The Liberal Position (on the moral limits of the 
criminal law).” 
 
3 Harmless Wrongdoing, xxviii. 
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action must have a victim.4 The question, according to Feinberg, when considering whether 
the community can legitimately criminalize an action, is always “Who is harmed [wronged]? 
Who can voice a personal grievance?”5 
 The community can only legitimately criminalize actions that have victims, Feinberg 
claims, because of standing reasons of personal autonomy. In order to understand this claim, 
let us consider Feinberg’s conception of personal autonomy. Feinberg writes that personal 
autonomy is valued by liberal theorists and legal moralists alike; in its most general form, it is 
the idea that people own their own lives, that they have a right to live however they see fit, 
so long as they are neither harming nor offending others.6 More specifically, to be personally 
autonomous is to have sovereignty over one’s own life—it is to have the sole authority to 
make decisions about oneself, about the course of one’s life. In order to clarify what falls 
under the somewhat vague notion of “one’s own life,” Feinberg follows Mill in recognizing a 
distinction between self- and other-regarding decisions.7 Other-regarding decisions primarily 
and for the most part affect the interests and rights of other people, while self-regarding 
decisions “primarily and directly affect only the interests of the decision maker.”8 Of course, 
this is a somewhat rough distinction, in that there will be cases at the edges that are hard to 
classify, but for the most part it is serviceable.9 So Feinberg claims that people’s sovereignty 
                                                
4 Note that, according to Feinberg, the harm and offense principles limit criminalize-able actions to those that 
wrong other people. See his argument against hard paternalism (the prohibition, for the sake of one’s own 
good, of consented-to actions that harm oneself) in Harm to Self, especially Chap. 17-20. 
 
5 Harmless Wrongdoing, 73. 
 
6 Harmless Wrongdoing, 62-4. 
 
7 Harm to Self, 56. For Mill’s distinction between self- and other-regarding decisions, see John Stuart Mill, On 
Liberty (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), Chap. 4, para. 3. 
 
8 Harm to Self, 56. 
 
9 Both Feinberg and Mill acknowledge the point that this distinction, while serviceable, is not perfectly clear- 
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extends to their self-regarding decisions; put simply, people have the right to control their 
own lives. Feinberg thus classifies personal autonomy as “the sovereign right of self-
government.”10 
Furthermore, Feinberg places absolute priority on this “doctrine” of “sovereign self-
rule;” while he admits that “demonstration of the doctrine is not possible,” he writes that 
“the reader may find that it resonates with something in his most fundamental moral 
attitudes.”11 And it does seem to resonate—think about the strong moral indignation we feel 
when someone else tries to control our life choices. We often say, when this occurs, things 
like “he has no right to stick his nose into my business. It’s my life, after all” and “he should 
leave me alone—my life belongs to me.”12 Feinberg argues that this notion of personal 
autonomy as sovereign is morally basic; he contends that personal autonomy is 
fundamentally valuable in its own right.13 This conception of personal autonomy, he thinks, 
“accords uniquely with a self-conception deeply embedded in the moral attitudes of most 
people.”14 Now, regarding personal autonomy as sovereign and thus as underivatively valuable 
is a departure from Mill, who argues that the value of personal autonomy is derived from the 
contribution that it makes to a person’s own good.15 However, Feinberg does not regard this 
as a drastic departure; he maintains that regarding personal autonomy as the sovereign right 
                                                                                                                                            
cut. See Feinberg’s Harm to Self, 56, and Mill’s On Liberty, Chap. 4, para. 8-11. 
 
10 Harm to Self, Diagram 19-1. 
 
11 Harm to Self, 52. 
 
12 For similar locutions, see Harm to Self, especially Chap. 18-19. 
 
13 Harm to Self, 59-62. 
 
14 Harm to Self, 62. 
 
15 On Liberty, Chap. 3, para. 1-8. 
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of self-government is in the spirit of Mill’s On Liberty.16 But drastic departure or not, 
Feinberg maintains that the right of self-government is sovereign, and that, because it is 
sovereign, it takes precedence even over one’s own good.17  
Given this understanding of personal autonomy as sovereign rule over one’s self-
regarding decisions, (i.e. one’s personal domain), we can see more clearly why Feinberg 
thinks that the community can only legitimately intervene, via the criminal law, in cases where 
there are victims.18 It is because this is the best way to respect personal autonomy: it blocks 
both the community and other individuals from unwarrantedly violating people’s personal 
domains. Protecting people’s personal domains from unwarranted violations by others by 
limiting those others’ liberty, Feinberg maintains, is not a violation of autonomy. As he says, 
“there is nothing offensive to autonomy in the practice of limiting some person’s liberty for 
the sake of…the protection of other persons, but [the practice is] morally odious when the 
end is anything else.”19 While it is legitimate to intervene in order to protect those people 
who would be made into victims by some other person’s actions, it is not legitimate to 
intervene in order to protect a person from the bad consequences of her own decisions. 
Such an intervention is morally odious, that is, illegitimate, because it is a violation of her 
sovereign authority to rule herself. Feinberg puts his view succinctly when he writes: 
If we assume with John Stuart Mill (excluding his occasional lapses) and the 
grand liberal tradition that the domain of the sovereign individual consists of 
                                                
16 This is in part because Feinberg thinks that Mill does not take a consistently utilitarian position regarding 
personal autonomy. See Harm to Self, Chap. 19, note 7. 
 
17 Harm to Self, 61. 
 
18 Feinberg argues from considerations of personal autonomy that the community’s moral standing to intervene 
is limited: he does not, however, give a complete argument for why the community has the moral standing to 
intervene at all, in any case. As Larry Alexander points out, “Feinberg scatters some hints about such matters 
but he does not provide sustained arguments.” Larry Alexander, “When Are We Rightfully Aggrieved? A 
Comment on Postema,” Legal Theory 11 (2005): 325. 
 
19 Harmless Wrongdoing, 68. 
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all his activities that do not seriously impinge on the important interests of 
other people, then we can say that respect for a person’s autonomy is respect for his 
unfettered voluntary choice as the sole rightful determinant of his actions except where the 
interests of others need protection from him. Whenever a person is compelled to act 
or not to act on the grounds that he must be protected from his own bad 
judgment even though no one else is endangered, then his autonomy is 
infringed.20 
 
We can see, then, that Feinberg’s commitment to the absolute priority of personal 
autonomy,21 which he maintains is a shared conviction among theorists,22 provides a strong 
reason for limiting the criminal law’s jurisdiction to those actions that have victims. 
Feinberg views personal sovereignty as “a moral trump card, not to be merely 
balanced with considerations of [self-] harm diminution in cases of conflict, but always and 
necessarily taking moral precedence over those considerations.”23 This leads him, I think, to 
talk about personal sovereignty in terms of rights; he maintains that personal autonomy is 
the sovereign right of self-government, that the “kernel of autonomy” is our right to make 
our critical life-decisions for ourselves, our right to arbitrate how we move (literally and 
metaphorically) through our lives.24 Throughout both Harm to Self and Harmless Wrongdoing, 
Feinberg seems to use rights-talk as a convenient way of specifying autonomy-talk. However, 
while he does prefer to talk about personal autonomy in terms of rights, the exact nature of 
the relation between personal autonomy and rights is not clear. There seem to be at least 
three ways to make out the relation: 1) rights constitute personal autonomy, 2) rights are a 
contingent means to personal autonomy, or 3) rights are a necessary means to personal 
                                                
20 Harm to Self, 68, italics in original. 
 
21 Harmless Wrongdoing, 130. 
 
22 Harmless Wrongdoing, 60-1. 
 
23 Harm to Self, 26. 
 
24 Harm to Self, 54. 
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autonomy. In support of his view that personal autonomy is the sovereign right of self-
government, I think that Feinberg would be likely to accept either (1) or (3).25 However, 
which one he would favor is irrelevant for my purposes: what is important is that Feinberg 
tends to put his appeals to personal sovereignty in terms of rights. As he puts it, “there must 
be a right to err, to be mistaken, to decide foolishly, to take big risks, if there is to be any 
meaningful self-rule…insofar as we force a person against his will into a condition he did 
not choose, we undermine his status as a person in rightful control of his own life.”26 We are 
in rightful control of our own lives, that is, we have sovereign self-rule, only if we each have 
the right to control our own life; so if we each have such a right, which Feinberg thinks we 
do, then violations of that and similar rights are violations of our personal autonomy. 
Feinberg, regarding personal autonomy as a moral trump card, cashes it out in terms of self-
regarding rights that operate as trumps in the personal domain.27 
So while the precise nature of the relationship between rights and personal autonomy 
is not clear, there is a significant connection between the two. This is understandable, I 
think, because Feinberg seems to hold the standard Hohfeldian view that rights are bundles 
of four elements—privileges, claims, powers, and immunities. These four elements together 
determine both what the right-bearer may do and what is owed to the right-bearer by 
others.28 In Feinberg’s own words, rights give their bearers the ability to make valid claims 
                                                
25 Given his comments in “The Nature and Value of Rights,” it seems very unlikely that Feinberg would accept 
(2). Joel Feinberg, “The Nature and Value of Rights,” Journal of Value Inquiry 4:4 (1970): esp. 252. 
 
26 Harm to Self, 62-70, emphasis added. 
 
27 Ronald Dworkin introduced the idea of rights as trumps. See his “Rights as Trumps” in Theories of Rights, ed. 
J. Waldron (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), 153-67. 
 
28 Wesley Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions: as applied in Judicial Reasoning, ed. W. Cook (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1946). Briefly, A has a privilege to do X iff A has no duty not to do X. A has a claim against B 
iff B has a duty to A to do X. A has a power iff A has the ability to alter her own or another’s privileges, claims, 
powers, or immunities. A has an immunity iff B lacks the ability to alter A’s privileges, claims, powers, or 
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on others, because someone’s having a right imposes a duty on others to respect that right.29 
So, when another does not respect her right, the right-bearer, in virtue of being a right-
bearer, can make a valid claim against that person. For example, my right of self-
determination gives me the power to demand of another that she not interfere with my 
voluntary choice to dye my hair, and if she does, it gives me the power to voice a grievance 
against her—I can say that she interfered when she had a duty not to do so (this duty is 
imposed on her by my right). However, it seems that I am not required to make a claim 
against the person who violated my right, because included in my right is the power to waive 
and/or adjust the duties that others owe to me in virtue of my having that right. Whether I 
exercise my ability to make a valid claim is up to me, because, in Hohfeldian terms, included 
in my right is the power to alter my own privileges, claims, powers, and immunities such that 
what duties others owe to me are changed in turn. Put simply, rights necessarily carry with 
them control-according normative power, such that their bearers have control over the 
duties that others owe to them. So, while having rights may not be everything there is to 
having personal autonomy, it does seem that personal autonomy is well-served by thinking 
about it in terms of rights.30 
This view of rights as necessarily including control-according normative power, 
along with Feinberg’s prioritization of personal autonomy, allows us to see why Feinberg 
adheres unconditionally to the Volenti maxim. The Volenti maxim, short for volenti non fit 
                                                                                                                                            
immunities. Any particular right, according to the Hohfeldian view, is a more or less complex set of these four 
elements. 
 
29 “The Nature and Value of Rights,” 253. 
 
30 Thanks to Jerry Postema for helping me to see the connection between rights and autonomy in this way. 
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injuria, states that “to one who has consented no wrong is done.”31 Feinberg interprets this to 
mean that one’s rights cannot be violated by another person’s action if one has consented to 
that action.32 He claims that this interpretation of the Volenti maxim “finds ample support in 
common sense;” he points out that “we don’t normally take seriously the person who” fully 
consents to some action of ours and then complains when we do it.33 Viewed in terms of 
rights, when a person consents to some action being done to her, she exercises her power to 
alter her own privileges, claims, powers, and immunities in a specific way; namely, she waives 
them so that they no longer impose a duty on the actor not to do the action. (More simply, 
we can say that she waives her right.) This waiving, because it takes away the duty that the 
other person has, makes it the case that, when the other person does perform the action in 
question, he does not violate her right. Precisely because she has (through waiving her right) 
waived his duty not to perform the action, he does not wrong her, that is, he does not violate 
her right, when he does perform the action. As Feinberg puts it, no wrong is done to the 
person who consents, because her “consent to the action makes it as if it were [her] own.”34 
So, assuming that a person cannot be wronged by, or a victim of, her own voluntary actions, 
it seems that she cannot be a victim in cases where she consents to others’ actions, because 
her consent is an exercise of a normative power to waive her right that she necessarily has in 
virtue of having that right. 
Furthermore, because Feinberg prioritizes personal autonomy, he claims that a 
person cannot be wronged by, or made a victim of, her own voluntary actions. Remember 
                                                
31 Harm to Others, 115. 
 
32 Harm to Others, 115. 
 
33 Harm to Others, 115. 
 
34 Harm to Self, 100. 
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that he regards sovereign self-rule as morally basic; this leads him to the conclusion that 
voluntary self-regarding actions do not fall within the purview of the criminal law. To say 
otherwise would be to subordinate a person’s sovereign self-rule to her own good; it would 
be to say that the community has the moral standing (regardless of whether it chooses to 
exercise it) to legislate people’s self-regarding decisions. This is precisely what Feinberg 
rejects. He thinks, rather, that we ought to accept the doctrine of sovereign self-rule, and 
that this doctrine entails that each person’s own voluntary self-regarding actions do not fall 
under the purview of either the harm or offense principles. Insofar as the Volenti maxim 
places “a person’s self-affecting actions and the consented-to behavior of others that affects 
him…in the same moral category,” then, such consented-to actions (like self-affecting 
actions) do not fall under the purview of either the harm or offense principles.35 So, Feinberg 
concludes that the Volenti maxim ought to hold in all cases where there is consent, lest we 
infringe on people’s personal autonomy.36 
At this point, it is important to note that Feinberg combines his unconditional 
adherence to the Volenti maxim with the claim that the maxim does not apply to cases where 
the consent is not fully voluntary. That is, he argues that, for a person’s exercise of her 
normative power to waive her right to count as consent, she must have exercised it freely 
and knowingly, in the absence of coercion. If her exercise of this normative power is 
coerced, then her action does not count as consent and so the Volenti maxim does not apply. 
As Feinberg puts it, the Volenti maxim “denies title to complain only to him whose consent 
was fully voluntary, and a person’s consent is fully voluntary only when he is a competent and 
                                                
35 Harm to Self, 100. 
 
36 Harmless Wrongdoing, esp. 165. 
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unimpaired adult who has not been threatened, misled, or lied to about relevant facts, nor 
manipulated by subtle forms of conditioning.”37 While there is a question about exactly what 
conditions must be in place for a person’s exercise of her normative power to waive her 
right to count as fully voluntary and thus as consent, I take it that this is a separate question 
for Feinberg, one whose answer is not determined by his adherence to the Volenti maxim. All 
that is required for the Volenti maxim to play a substantive role in Feinberg’s theory is that 
the conditions for consent are such that ordinary people in everyday life can meet them.38 
For the purposes of this paper, I shall assume, as I think Feinberg does, such plausible 
conditions of consent. Nevertheless, not much turns on this assumption; what does the 
work is the assumption that if there are conditions that must be met for the exercise of one’s 
normative power to waive one’s right to count as consent, they are fulfillable, such that it is 
always possible, in principle, for a person to consent to some action being done to him. 
II. The Gladiator Case 
 Feinberg’s prioritizing of personal autonomy, as we have seen, leads him to adhere 
unconditionally to the Volenti maxim. He concludes that where there is consent, there is no 
victim, and thus that the community may not legitimately intervene in such cases via the 
criminal law. Nevertheless, even he admits that there are certain cases that are intuitively very 
troubling for his theory. These cases are ones where, despite there being no victim according 
to Feinberg’s theory, we, and Feinberg, still have a sense that the action described in the case 
should be prohibited by the criminal law. Importantly, the intuition in these troubling cases 
                                                
37 Harm to Others, 116. 
 
38 Feinberg endorses soft paternalism, the position that the community can legitimately put certain safeguards 
in place, such as required psychiatric testing, in order to protect people against involuntarily consenting to 
harmful actions. He points out that if the risk to the actor is especially high, we do have good reason to make 
sure that his consent is fully voluntary and thus that he is not being made into a victim. However, if his consent 
is fully voluntary and informed, then, Feinberg concludes, the community cannot legitimately intervene. See 
Harm to Others, Chap. 3 §5, esp. 116-7, Harm to Self, 61-2, and Harmless Wrongdoing, 129-30. 
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does not seem to be that such actions should be criminalized for purely practical reasons, 
such as the difficulty of ensuring fully voluntary and informed consent; rather, it is that the 
actions should be criminalized because they are morally wrong.39 Feinberg struggles at length 
with two such cases, Irving Kristol’s gladiator case and Derek Parfit’s unnecessary suffering 
case.40 For the purposes of this paper, which is concerned with the limits of consent, I shall 
focus on Feinberg’s description of and response to Kristol’s gladiator case. 
Kristol presents the gladiator case as a counterexample to Feinberg’s type of 
liberalism, which, because of the fundamental value that it accords to personal autonomy, 
claims that only those actions that have victims, in the sense described above, can 
legitimately be prohibited by the criminal law. Kristol writes that “I know of no one, no 
matter how free in spirit, who argues that we ought to permit gladiatorial contests in Yankee 
Stadium, similar to those once performed in the Colosseum at Rome—even if only 
consenting adults were involved.”41 The challenge here to the liberal, and by extension, 
Feinberg, is straightforward: assuming that everyone involved (both the gladiators and the 
adult audience) truly consents,42 it seems clear that there is no victim, and yet, it seems 
equally clear that such contests ought not to be permitted, that is, that they ought to be 
prohibited by the criminal law. And furthermore, as Feinberg admits, the challenge is a 
legitimate one; it cannot be dismissed on the grounds that it is a far-fetched example, nor 
diffused by the claim that we are responding on the basis of the practical problems inherent 
                                                
39 Harmless Wrongdoing, 129 and 332-3. 
 
40 For Feinberg’s discussion of Parfit’s case, see Harmless Wrongdoing, Chap. 28, §8 and 325-8. For Feinberg’s 
discussion of Kristol’s case, see Harmless Wrongdoing, Chap. 30, §2 and 328-31. 
 
41 Irving Kristol, “Pornography, Obscenity, and the Case for Censorship,” in Morality, Harm, and the Law, ed. 
Gerald Dworkin (Boulder: Westview Press, Inc., 1994), 47. 
 
42 That is, that everyone involved meets whatever conditions are necessary for the exercise of their normative 
powers to count as consent. 
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in ensuring that all involved have consented. On the contrary, Feinberg writes, it is all too 
easy to imagine an enterprising businessman setting up such a contest, and, more 
importantly, that 
Almost anyone would concede that the bloody contest would be an evil, and 
most would be willing to concede (at least at first) that the evil would be in 
the non-grievance category, since in virtue of the careful observance of the 
Volenti maxim, there would be no aggrieved victim. Moreover, the evil 
involved, in all of its multiple faces, would be a moral one.43 
 
Thus, it seems that there is a real clash between Feinberg’s liberal theory and our intuitions 
here, a clash that demands a substantive answer. Assuming that we feel the pull of the 
intuition that such contests ought to be prohibited by the criminal law, Kristol’s case 
presents a real problem: how, Feinberg asks, without resorting to hypocrisy, “could we 
advocate legal prohibition without abandoning the liberal position?”44 
 Feinberg, in the spirit of crafting a reasonable liberal theory, (i.e., a liberal theory that 
most people might actually accept), wants to accommodate our strong intuition that 
gladiator contests of this sort ought to be prohibited by the criminal law. He acknowledges 
that, according to his theory, there are no victims in the case that Kristol describes—because 
everyone consented, no one’s rights have been violated. Whatever the conditions on consent 
might be (see above), Feinberg assumes, rightly I think, that a) they have been met by all of 
the participants in the case and b) that this does not solve the problem. The intuition that 
such a gladiatorial contest ought to be legally prohibited seems to remain strong, regardless 
of the fact that, in the imagined case, both the gladiators and the crowd consented. Given 
this, Feinberg offers two possible avenues of response: the first involves admitting that the 
gladiator case may well be a limiting case for his liberalism, while the second involves 
                                                
43 Harmless Wrongdoing, 129. 
 
44 Harmless Wrongdoing, 128. 
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insisting that what we are intuitively reacting to when we respond to the case is the “clear 
and present danger” inherent in it for a massive amount of indirect harm to others.45 As I 
shall explain in detail below, neither of these two responses is satisfactory—the first requires 
Feinberg to give up a major tenet of his liberal theory, and the second essentially mis-
describes the intuition that Feinberg is trying to accommodate. 
III. Feinberg’s Solutions and Why They Fail 
 The first available response, Feinberg claims, is simply to admit that, despite the fact 
that there is no victim in the gladiator case, the community can nevertheless legitimately 
prohibit it via the criminal law. However, to say this is to give up the claim that the 
community can legitimately prohibit via the criminal law only those actions that violate either 
the harm or offense principles, because it is to admit that some action, despite being 
victimless, can nonetheless be prohibited. To go this route is to accept the general principle 
that “it is always right, other things being equal, to prevent evils; that the need to prevent 
evils of any description is a good kind of reason in support of a legal prohibition.”46 In short, 
because preventing evils is good, ‘that it will prevent an evil’ counts as a reason in favor of 
prohibition via the criminal law. The implication here is that the community can legitimately 
prohibit via the criminal law all evils, including those that wrong no one, that are, in other 
words, victimless. If Feinberg takes this line, then the mere fact that the gladiator case is a 
moral evil gives the community the moral standing to prohibit it via the criminal law; the 
only question left is whether the community is justified in doing so.47 The key point to notice 
                                                
45 Harmless Wrongdoing, 132. 
 
46 Harmless Wrongdoing, 5, emphasis added. 
 
47 Whether or not the gladiator case is actually a moral evil may be up for debate; however, I assume, with 
Feinberg, that it is one. For if it is not, then it seems that the initial challenge to the liberal does not get off the 
ground. 
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here is that, if Feinberg gives this response, he has essentially changed his view about the 
criminal law’s jurisdiction; it is no longer limited to actions that have victims, but 
encompasses all evils, even those that neither violate anyone’s rights nor seriously offend 
anyone without her consent. 
 However, to say this, that the community has the jurisdiction to prohibit such “free-
floating” evils via the criminal law (they are free-floating because there is no victim to whom 
they can be attached), is to accept a version of the legal moralist position.48 As Gerald 
Postema points out, this is a significant weakening of Feinberg’s position; rather than 
maintaining that the harm and offense principles exhaust the scope of the community’s 
jurisdiction, Feinberg at this point acknowledges that the prevention of free-floating evils is a 
relevant reason for the criminalization of actions, albeit not a very weighty, or strong, 
reason.49 As Postema writes, Feinberg, with this move, “abandoned the liberal project of 
drawing a line on a principled basis between those considerations that may ground criminal-
law interference with individual liberty and those that may not. This is no merely marginal 
adjustment; it is a change that goes to the heart of the liberal project as Feinberg (following 
Mill) and many others have understood it.”50 Especially because Feinberg, unlike Mill, 
regards sovereign self-rule as morally basic, his admittance of a liberty-limiting principle that 
allows the community to legitimately interfere with people’s self-regarding choices seems to 
constitute a major change in his position. I agree with Postema that Feinberg’s taking the 
position that the community has the jurisdiction to prohibit all evils via the criminal law is a 
mistake, insofar as it constitutes an abandonment of the particular liberal position that 
                                                
48 Harmless Wrongdoing, 4. 
 
49 Gerald Postema, “Politics is about the Grievance: Feinberg on the Legal Enforcement of Morals,” Legal 
Theory 11 (2005): 301-2. 
 
50 “Politics is about the Grievance,” 302, italics in original. 
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Feinberg has worked so hard to defend. To view the gladiator case in this way, as a limiting 
case for his liberalism, is to give up on the claim that personal sovereignty acts as a moral 
trump card. In order to maintain this essential component of his liberal theory, Feinberg 
ought to go for another solution, one that does not require him to give up his stance that the 
community’s jurisdiction is limited to those actions that have victims. 
 The second response that Feinberg offers to the problem of the gladiator case would 
allow him to maintain his liberal position. However, this response, I argue, is also 
unsatisfactory, because it does not actually track all of our intuitions about the case. Feinberg 
argues that when we judge the gladiator case to be a moral wrong, we are not responding to 
the death of one of the gladiators; although this result is an “evil,” Feinberg writes that “so 
long as we adhere to the doctrine of the absolute priority of personal autonomy, that sort of 
evil is always more than counterbalanced (indeed it is as if cancelled out) by prior consent to 
the risk.”51 Because the gladiator consented, he is not a victim; he has no grievance against 
his killer, or against anyone else involved, for that matter. What strikes us as intuitively 
wrong in the gladiator case, according to Feinberg, is not that someone is killed—his 
unconditional adherence to the Volenti maxim rules this out. No, he claims that the “evil 
consists in the objective regrettability of millions deriving pleasure from brutal bloodshed 
and others getting rich exploiting their moral weakness…even though no one actually was 
wronged by it, and there is no one to voice a personal grievance at it.”52 We recoil from this 
evil, claims Feinberg, because when we imagine such a case, we inevitably think about what a 
society that enjoyed such blood sport would be like, and naturally suppose that it would be a 
horrifying mess of violence and terror. 
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As he puts it, “we import into the example a nightmare of unconsented-to indirect 
harms…[imagining] a brutal society full of thugs and bullies who delight in human suffering, 
whose gladiatorial rituals concentrate and reinforce their callous insensitivity and render it 
respectable.”53 The sort of people who enjoy such contests, we imagine, are the sort of 
people who are extremely likely to severely harm others; thus, when we respond to the case, 
Feinberg argues, what we are really responding to is the supposed presence and actions of 
these very dangerous people. Now, if Feinberg is correct to say that this is what we are 
responding to when we conclude that the gladiator case should be prohibited by the criminal 
law, then it seems that this is not really a case of intuitively wanting to prohibit a free-floating 
evil. What we are trying to prevent when we prohibit the gladiator case is not simply the 
objective regrettability—the free-floating evil—mentioned earlier; rather, we are trying to 
prevent the strong likelihood that others will be harmed as a result of the gladiatorial 
contest’s occurring. What we want to avoid, according to Feinberg, is the “clear and present 
danger that some innocent parties (identities now unknown) will suffer” at the hands of the 
spectators, and we think that this suffering will occur because we imagine that such 
spectators must be brutes.54 Why else, after all, would they attend the gruesome spectacle of 
the gladiatorial contest? If this is an accurate reconstruction of our thought processes, then it 
seems that we wish to prohibit the gladiator case via the criminal law in order to prevent 
harm to others. Of course, the harm that we are responding to is indirect—it is the suffering 
of people not directly mentioned in the hypothetical scenario—but still, it is a case of 
wishing to prevent harm to others, and insofar as it is a case of harming others, according to 
Feinberg, it rightly falls under the community’s auspices. 
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In claiming that the problem with the gladiator case is that it involves indirect harm 
to others, this response places the case squarely within the community’s jurisdiction as 
spelled out by the harm and offense principles. However, this response does require 
Feinberg to admit that, if Kristol explicitly denies that the spectators in the case are brutes 
and thugs, then there is no reason to legally prohibit the contest. If, by stipulation, the 
spectators are harmless, then Feinberg contends that we lose our strong intuition that the 
contest ought to be prohibited via the criminal law; he writes that when we think that no 
third parties at all are endangered, the intuition to which Kristol appealed, “that the gladiator 
show is a sufficiently great evil to counterbalance autonomous liberty on the scales, 
is…substantially weakened.”55 However, I think that this is a mistake; even when we think 
that no innocent people will ever suffer at the hands of the spectators, it seems that we still 
intuitively think that the gladiator case ought to be prohibited by the criminal law. In other 
words, I think that Feinberg’s second response, because it focuses solely on the possibility of 
indirect harm to others, does not actually track all of our intuitions about the case. 
 Now, this is not to say that Feinberg is entirely incorrect; I agree that part of what we 
are responding to when we consider Kristol’s case is the thought that people who would pay 
dearly to watch a gladiatorial contest are the sort of people who are likely to inflict harm on 
others. We wish to prevent that harm, and that desire is part of what leads us to conclude 
that the gladiator contest should be prohibited by the criminal law. However, there is 
another aspect of the case that I think we are responding to, as can be seen when we imagine 
that the spectators are perfectly harmless. It seems that, in this slightly altered case, we still 
intuitively think that the contest ought to be prohibited by the criminal law, even when it is 
guaranteed that no indirect harms will occur as a result. I suggest that our intuitive response 
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here is the result of the thought that the gladiators themselves should not have been allowed 
to consent to the contest. In this case, we seem to feel that the gladiators’ consent does not 
cancel out the wrong done to them—despite their ex hypothesi fully voluntary consent, it 
seems that we think that they have still been wronged. The problem with the case is not just 
that the spectators are likely to be brutal, harmful people; it is also that the gladiators 
themselves are seriously wronged. More generally, it seems that we intuitively think that the 
Volenti maxim does not hold unconditionally; there are times when a person’s fully voluntary 
consent does not nullify the wrong done to her. The gladiator case, I suggest, is an instance 
of this—we think that the Volenti maxim does not apply to the gladiators’ consent, despite 
the fact that their consent is, ex hypothesi, fully voluntary. Feinberg, as we have seen, denies 
this; he argues that the Volenti maxim does hold unconditionally, and thus that, because the 
gladiators fully voluntarily consented, no wrong is done to them. 
 I think that this is the wrong thing for Feinberg to say here. I argue that our intuitive 
thought that the gladiators are wronged, despite their consent, is correct, because our 
intuition that the Volenti maxim does not hold unconditionally is correct. Furthermore, I 
think that Feinberg can accommodate this intuition into his theory. In the next section, I 
shall attempt to demonstrate that his theory, in virtue of its adherence to the doctrine of 
sovereign self-rule, can allow for limits to the Volenti maxim. Placing principled limitations 
on the Volenti maxim will enable Feinberg to support the intuition that the gladiators are 
wronged, and thus wholeheartedly support the strong intuition that the gladiator contest 
ought to be prohibited by the criminal law. 
IV. Feinberg’s Liberalism: Limiting the Volent i  Maxim 
 As I have diagnosed it, the problem is that Feinberg does not allow limitations to the 
Volenti maxim. He adheres to the maxim unconditionally because it upholds personal 
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autonomy, and he regards personal autonomy as “even more important than personal well-
being.”56 Feinberg clearly demonstrates the relation between the Volenti maxim and personal 
autonomy when he writes that, “so long as we adhere to the doctrine of the absolute priority 
of personal autonomy,” the evil done to the gladiators “is always more than counterbalanced 
(indeed it is as if cancelled out) by prior consent to the risk.”57 The Volenti maxim, for Feinberg, is 
in service to the doctrine of the absolute priority of personal autonomy, i.e. the doctrine of 
sovereign self-rule. He adheres to the Volenti maxim unconditionally because he thinks that 
doing so properly respects each person’s status as a sovereign self-ruler. However, because 
the Volenti maxim is in service to the doctrine of sovereign self-rule, it seems that it would be 
absurd to hold to the Volenti maxim when to do so would be to abandon the doctrine of 
sovereign self-rule. What Feinberg cares about is properly respecting each person’s status as 
a sovereign self-ruler. So if, in certain cases, application of the Volenti maxim deeply 
undercuts or contravenes this status, then it seems that the maxim, and not respect for the 
status, should be given up. In short, if it is possible for the Volenti maxim and the doctrine of 
sovereign self-rule to come apart in this way, then it seems that Feinberg, given his 
prioritization of sovereign self-rule, ought to limit the Volenti maxim so that it does not apply 
in such cases. I shall argue first that it is possible that adherence to the Volenti maxim, in 
some cases, can constitute an abandonment of the doctrine of sovereign self-rule, and then 
will proceed to demonstrate that such an abandonment occurs in the gladiator case. 
 Above, I understood Feinberg as maintaining that each substantive right confers on 
its bearer the normative power of waive-ability. Thus, it is in principle possible for a person 
to waive each of her rights, and, following the Volenti maxim, Feinberg maintains that she is 
                                                
56 Harm to Self, 59. 
 
57 Harmless Wrongdoing, 130, emphasis added. 
 
 
 20 
not wronged if she has fully voluntarily consented to an action being done to her that would 
normally violate one or another of her (now waived) rights. Similarly, it is in principle 
possible for a person to waive all of her rights,58 and again, following the Volenti maxim, 
Feinberg maintains that she is not wronged by any actions that would normally violate any of 
her (now waived) rights. Rights, by their nature, are waive-able by their bearers, and it seems 
that the doctrine of sovereign self-rule requires us to respect each person’s control over her 
own rights. However, it is not clear that people have control over their status as sovereign 
self-rulers in the same way that they have control over their rights. To waive one’s status as a 
sovereign self-ruler would be not only to waive all of one’s rights, but also to declare that 
one is not the sort of being who is capable of having the normative powers accorded by 
rights. This is subtly different from simply waiving all of one’s rights, because, even in 
waiving all of one’s rights, one remains eligible, so to speak, to have rights. (One could, in 
principle, re-gain old rights or acquire new rights.) To waive one’s status as a sovereign self-
ruler is to deny that one is eligible to have rights; it is to deny that one is “an appropriate 
locus of rights and duties.”59 
 We cannot take such a denial literally, however, because a person’s status as the sort 
of being who is an appropriate locus of rights and duties is not fully under her control. As 
John Kleinig puts it, “this status is not alienable as other claims might be.”60 This becomes 
apparent when we remember that any person who waives her rights still, as an appropriate 
locus of rights and duties, has duties to others. As a person in Feinberg’s sense, she still has 
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an obligation to respect other people’s rights, and this obligation is not nullified by her 
renunciation of her own rights. Feinberg seems to recognize this when he writes, in his 
discussion of voluntary slavery, that “no man can make himself into a mere instrument of 
another’s will. Even an autonomous agent cannot alienate his ultimate accountability.”61 The 
voluntary slave can and does give up all of her rights; what she cannot give up are her 
obligations to treat others in certain ways, obligations she has in virtue of her status as an 
appropriate locus of rights and duties. For example, say that Allie has given up all of her 
rights to Bertrand (she has voluntarily consented to be Bertrand’s slave). Bertrand then tells 
Allie to kill Carol. Allie, I think, still has an obligation not to kill Carol, because Carol has a 
right to life and Allie is the sort of being for whom another’s right generates a corresponding 
duty. Despite Allie’s being a slave, i.e., having given up her rights, it seems true that Carol 
can still make a valid claim against Allie, because Carol’s right imposes a duty on Allie. We 
strongly resist the thought that Allie is not accountable for her action at all, because we 
regard her, even though she is a slave, as the sort of being who both has obligations to 
others and has control over those obligations.62 More generally, we resist the thought that 
she can give up her status as an appropriate locus of rights and duties; thus, we agree that 
Carol can make a valid claim against her. As Feinberg puts it, slaves, despite their slavery, are 
still ultimately accountable for their actions. 
As I have said, I understand this to mean that Allie not only retains her obligation to 
Carol, but also retains the choice of whether or not to fulfill that obligation. For Feinberg, 
choice is at the heart of his understanding of persons as autonomous: to say that Allie retains 
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her obligations to others (which he strongly suggests with his use of “accountability”) 
without retaining the ability to choose whether or not to fulfill those obligations would be to 
abandon his moral conception of persons as sovereign self-rulers. It would be to agree that 
Allie has a personal domain but to deny that she has any control over it whatsoever. 
Feinberg, I think, should deny this, because to accept it would deeply undermine his 
conception of persons as personally autonomous. He should instead maintain that, insofar as 
people are the sorts of beings who are obligation-bearers, they are the sorts of beings who 
have the ability to choose whether or not to fulfill those obligations. So he should conclude 
that Allie, insofar as she cannot waive those obligations that are imposed on her by others’ 
rights, cannot waive the ability to make choices regarding those obligations. If he does not 
reach this conclusion, it is difficult to see how Allie is accountable for her actions. On the 
other hand, if she cannot waive her ability to make choices about her obligations, then we 
can make sense of the claim that she is accountable. As Feinberg puts it, people cannot 
“become in every moral and legal respect exactly like cattle because human negotiators 
cannot agree to alienate their personhood.”63 Allie still has personal autonomy, despite having 
given up her rights; that is, she still has the choice of whether or not to fulfill the obligations 
that she has to others, and this is a choice that she cannot give up because she cannot give 
up the obligations that she has in virtue of her status as an appropriate locus of rights and 
duties. So, insofar as a person does not have full control over the duties imposed on her by 
others, she cannot waive her status as an appropriate locus of rights and duties, and thus 
cannot completely waive her personal autonomy.64 To say otherwise is to abandon the 
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normative conception of persons as personally autonomous to which Feinberg is committed. 
 If this is correct, then it seems that refusing to regard voluntarily waiving one’s status 
as personally autonomous as possible actually supports Feinberg’s understanding of personal 
autonomy. Allie is not “free not to be free,” in a sense, because she always necessarily 
maintains her ability to choose whether or not to fulfill her obligations: this is not a choice 
that she, as an autonomous being, can give up.65 So, given Feinberg’s prioritization of 
personal autonomy, he should say that the Volenti maxim does not apply to cases where the 
person in question attempts to consent to treatment that denies her sovereignty over 
decisions regarding her obligations, because such treatment would necessarily be a violation 
of her personal autonomy. Gerald Postema seems to feel the force of this when he writes, 
during a discussion of the Volenti maxim, that “fully competent moral agents lack the power to 
release others from certain forms of treatment of them.”66 Bertrand violates Allie’s personal 
autonomy when he takes the decision of whether or not to fulfill her obligation to Carol out 
of her hands, and Allie lacks the power to make Bertrand’s action a non-violation of her 
personal autonomy because her control over her own obligations is not something that she 
can give up. Allie’s consent cannot nullify the wrong done to her by Bertrand because she 
cannot waive her status as sovereign over her duties. By recognizing this fact, and thus 
refusing to recognize Allie’s consent as a legitimate waiver, we actually respect her personal 
autonomy far more than if we were to recognize her ability to consent to such treatment. 
Because adhering to the Volenti maxim in such a case would contravene, rather than respect, 
personal autonomy, we should, in light of the importance of personal autonomy, limit the 
Volenti maxim so that it does not apply when the consented-to treatment denies the status of 
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the consenting person as an appropriate locus of rights and duties. 
 If this is correct, then the community can legitimately intervene, via the criminal law, 
in cases where a person is being treated as though she does not have the normative status of 
a sovereign self-ruler. The reason that the community can legitimately intervene is because 
such treatment is harmful; it wrongs the person so treated because it infringes on her 
personal autonomy (which she necessarily retains in virtue of retaining her obligations to 
others). To demonstrate this, I shall try to say something more about what such treatment 
would look like in the voluntary slave case. Broadly, it involves denying that Allie has any 
obligations to other people; to say that she does not have the appropriate normative status is 
to say that she is not accountable for any of her actions. She is, rather, akin to a tool, and as 
such, cannot be morally mistreated. She can perhaps be morally misused, in the way that a 
gun can be morally misused when someone uses it to kill people, but she cannot be morally 
mistreated, because to say this would be to suggest that she has a normative status that 
demands certain forms of treatment as morally appropriate.67 So however Bertrand treats 
Allie, when he treats her as lacking the normative status of a sovereign self-ruler, he is not 
treating her that way because he owes such treatment to her; rather, he is treating her that way 
because he feels like it.68 The problem with the treatment, then, is not its specific content, 
but rather its context. What is wrong with Bertrand’s treatment of Allie is that it is not done 
out of his recognition of her status as a personally autonomous being; it is done out of his 
                                                
67 In much the same way, one can misuse, but not mistreat, rocks, trees, coke machines, etc. I suspect that one 
mistreats, rather than misuses, certain sufficiently complex animals, and I think that this shows that such 
animals do have a normative status. If they do, though, I think that it is not the same type of normative status 
that is under discussion here, because animals, regardless of their complexity, cannot owe obligations either to 
each other or to persons. I add the modifier ‘sufficiently complex’ here because it seems that one cannot 
mistreat ants, amoebas, etc. 
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recognition that no treatment of her would count as wronging her. It might count as 
wronging someone else (such as Carol), but it cannot wrong Allie, because, as Bertrand 
regards her, she lacks the normative status necessary to be wronged. His treatment of her 
effectively severs the relevant connection between her existence and her personal autonomy. 
Such treatment, however benevolent, thus wrongs Allie, because it arises out of and occurs in 
a context that, because it denies her status as an appropriate locus of rights and duties, 
utterly demeans and denies her personal autonomy. 
 If I am correct in saying both that such treatment wrongs Allie and that we ought 
not to recognize her consent to such treatment as legitimate, then it seems that I can 
conclude that, according to Feinberg’s theory, the community can legitimately intervene via 
the criminal law in order to prevent such treatment. At this point, I shall attempt to show 
that the gladiator case is morally on a par with the voluntary slave case, and thus that the 
community can legitimately intervene to prevent such a gladiatorial contest from occurring. 
The context in the gladiator case, I shall argue, is relevantly similar to that of the voluntary 
slave case—the gladiators are being treated, both by their fellow gladiators and by the 
promoters, supporters, and spectators of the contest, as though they lack the normative 
status required for personal autonomy. To begin, notice how the gladiators treat each other. 
As Postema puts it, they deny to each other “the most basic forms of moral decency owed 
by one person to another.”69 More specifically, each gladiator treats each other gladiator 
solely as a tool to be used, as something to be treated in a certain way so as to further the 
acting gladiator’s own ends. Along these lines, it seems more natural to say that the 
gladiators, from their internal point of view, misuse, rather than mistreat, each other. While 
not conclusive proof, this may be a sign that each one is treating the others as though they 
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lack the normative status required for personal autonomy. After all, what could count as 
mistreatment of one gladiator by another? Intuitively, if gladiator David poisoned gladiator 
Edmund’s food, this might count as David mistreating Edmund. (Edmund, after all, agreed 
to risk his life in the gladiatorial arena, not at the dinner table.) But it seems that, in the 
context of the gladiatorial contest, David would be viewed, both by himself and by the 
promoters, supporters, and spectators, not as having mistreated Edmund, but rather as having 
broken the rules of the game. David, the promoters, the supporters, and the spectators 
appear to view David’s behavior as inappropriate not because it constitutes moral 
mistreatment of Edmund, but because it cheats them out of their spectacle. But to view 
David and his actions, and also Edmund, in this way just is to view them as the sort of 
beings who are not appropriate loci of rights and duties. Thus, however David and Edmund 
actually treat each other, that treatment arises from a context that utterly denies both David’s 
and Edmund’s personal autonomy. So, in order to respect the gladiators’ personal autonomy, 
it seems that Feinberg ought to say that the community can legitimately intervene to prevent 
such a personal-autonomy-denying context from occurring. 
 Furthermore, it is easy to imagine that the promoters, supporters, and spectators 
encourage the gladiators’ callous treatment of each other. However, even if they do not do 
so, it seems that the promoters, supporters, and spectators are treating the gladiators as tools 
rather than as persons, because the context is such that no treatment of the gladiators 
counts, in the promoters’, supporters’, and spectators’ eyes, as wronging the gladiators. Some 
treatment might count as ruining the contest (such as shooting the gladiators with a long-
range rifle), but it is far from clear that such treatment would count, from the promoters’, 
supporters’, and spectators’ point of view, as violating the gladiators’ personal autonomy. 
The promoters, supporters, and spectators regard the gladiators as able to be misused, but 
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not as able to be mistreated. Their treatment of the gladiators, like Bertrand’s treatment of 
Allie, is thus rooted in a denial of the gladiators’ normative status as appropriate loci of 
rights and duties. Feinberg seems to think that it is only the gladiators’ lives that are at 
stake.70 This is erroneous, because, as I have attempted to demonstrate, the gladiators 
consent not only to the risk to their lives, but also to being treated as though they do not 
have a normative status that demands certain forms of treatment as morally appropriate. The 
gladiators, if allowed to consent to the contest, would effectively be giving up their moral 
accountability; morally, they would be on a par with the voluntary slave who is viewed 
merely as chattel. So, to recognize the gladiators’ consent as legitimate and thus as nullifying 
the wrong done to them would, just as in the voluntary slave case, be to uphold the Volenti 
maxim at the expense of personal autonomy. If we are to maintain Feinberg’s position that 
personal autonomy takes priority, then we should conclude that the community can 
legitimately criminalize gladiatorial contests, because allowing such contests to occur would 
deeply undermine Feinberg’s principle message of the doctrine of sovereign self-rule.71 
 Notice that it is the context in which the gladiatorial contest occurs that leads us to 
the conclusion that allowing such a contest to happen would be to abandon our 
commitment to upholding personal autonomy. Because it is the context that is doing the 
work, we can distinguish between the gladiator case, on the one hand, and soldier and 
dueling cases on the other. Consider a soldier; at first glance, he may look a lot like the 
gladiator. He has given up his right to life, and he takes orders from his superiors. However, 
it seems that the soldier is different than the gladiator because he continues to be recognized 
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as having a normative status, as the sort of being that is an appropriate locus of rights and 
duties. More specifically, the soldier maintains his accountability: he is held responsible for 
choosing whether or not to obey orders. Moreover, this responsibility is not merely formal 
or empty; the soldier is expected to disobey orders that he regards as morally atrocious, that 
force him to disregard the obligations imposed on him by others’ rights. It seems that there 
is a moral line past which the soldier’s defense that he was “just following orders” does not 
apply—it seems that we rightly hold the soldiers involved in the My Lai massacre, and not 
just their commanding lieutenant, accountable for their actions. To suggest that the soldiers 
did not morally mistreat the Vietnamese when they killed them, while maintaining that the 
lieutenant did morally mistreat the Vietnamese when he gave the order to kill them, is to 
deny that the soldiers are personally autonomous; it is to treat the soldiers as mere tools of 
the lieutenant rather than as persons in their own right. We respect the soldiers’ autonomy 
by holding them accountable; unlike the gladiators, the context surrounding the soldiers is 
such that it (at least minimally) respects their personal autonomy. I suggest that if the military 
context surrounding the soldiers is not such that their personal autonomy is recognized in 
this way, then the soldiers are relevantly like gladiators. If the soldiers are forced to blindly 
follow orders in all situations, then it seems plausible to say that their normative status as 
personally autonomous beings is not being respected. In such a case, despite the soldiers’ 
consent to such treatment, I would argue that the community can legitimately intervene 
either to prevent the creation of, or to destroy, the elements of the military context that are 
responsible for the soldiers being regarded and thus treated as though they are merely 
chattel.72 
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 Considering the dueling case, I think that Feinberg can say that the problem with 
dueling is the culture that usually surrounds it. Dueling, historically, is a product of honor-
based societies; as such, there was an incredible amount of social pressure both to challenge 
a person to a duel if he slighted one’s honor, and to accept a duel if one was challenged. 
Under these circumstances, it seems that Feinberg can deny that the participants in such 
duels in fact fully voluntarily consented to the actions being done to them. Remember his 
comments about what it takes for consent to count as fully voluntary: he points out that 
“both force and fraud can invalidate consent, and that “force” can be very subtle indeed.”73 
The immense social pressure that was historically put on participants to consent to dueling, I 
think, counts as force. If this is correct, then it seems that the duel participants did not fully 
voluntarily consent, and so that the Volenti maxim, as Feinberg understands it, does not 
apply to their situation. However, in the modern era, there is not usually any serious social 
pressure to consent to participate in a duel.74 Thus, it seems that if one did fully voluntarily 
consent to a duel in present-day society, she would not be wronged—in Feinberg’s sense—if 
she were to be wounded or killed during the course of the duel. Of course, as Feinberg 
points out, when the risks are great, it seems like the community can legitimately intervene in 
order to ensure that the participants are fully voluntarily consenting. However, if it is 
determined that they are (perhaps through extensive psychiatric testing), then the community 
cannot legitimately interfere with their choice, because to do so would be to violate their 
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personal autonomy. So, while on the face of it dueling looks similar to the gladiator case, it is 
contextually quite different, and so can be easily accommodated by Feinberg’s theory.75 
Respecting the Volenti maxim in the modern-day dueling case, unlike in the gladiator case, 
seems to uphold the doctrine of sovereign self-rule; thus, we should conclude that, assuming 
fully voluntary consent, the community cannot legitimately intervene in cases of modern-day 
dueling. 
 This is importantly different from the gladiator case: as I have attempted to 
demonstrate, respecting the Volenti maxim in the gladiator case does not uphold the doctrine 
of sovereign self-rule. I have argued that the wrongful treatment suffered by the gladiators at 
the hands of each other, the promoters, the supporters, and the spectators should still be 
recognized as wrongful treatment, despite the gladiators’ consent, because to not recognize it 
as such would be to ignore what is demanded by the doctrine of sovereign self-rule. If this is 
correct, then it seems that the gladiator case does fall within the legitimate jurisdiction of the 
criminal law as spelled out by Feinberg’s harm and offense principles. So, for the sake of 
respecting the personal autonomy of the gladiators, Feinberg should conclude that the 
Volenti maxim has limits, and thus that the community can legitimately criminalize 
gladiatorial contests. Such a conclusion would allow Feinberg to readily endorse both the 
strong intuition that the gladiators are wronged and the strong intuition that the gladiatorial 
contests ought to be prohibited by the criminal law. 
V. A Friendly Suggestion to Feinberg? 
 Throughout, I have tried to present my argument as a friendly amendment to 
                                                
75 People may have the intuition that it is not enough to ensure that fully voluntary consent is occurring, and 
that modern communities should outlaw dueling altogether. I have suggested that our intuitions come from our 
thought that the participants have not really consented, but have been coerced in some way. If people’s 
intuitions persist, even after the conditions that must be met for the consent to count as fully voluntary are 
enumerated in detail, then it seems that their intuitions may just not be friendly to the generally liberal line of 
thought being pursued. 
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Feinberg’s view, one that allows him to make sense of the troubling gladiator case while still 
sticking to his liberal guns, so to speak. In an effort to avoid having to take up a version of 
legal moralism, I have presented an argument for limiting the Volenti maxim while still 
maintaining that the criminal law only has jurisdiction over those actions that are picked out 
by the harm and offense principles. When we think about why Feinberg adheres to the 
Volenti maxim in the first place, namely, in order to uphold the doctrine of sovereign self-
rule, we can see that the Volenti maxim ought to be limited to apply only to those situations 
where its application ensures, rather than infringes on, the exercise of personal autonomy. 
Applying the Volenti maxim to the gladiator case actually infringes on the gladiators’ personal 
autonomy by creating a context wherein they are treated as utterly lacking personal 
autonomy. To treat people as utterly lacking personal autonomy goes against the doctrine of 
sovereign self-rule. So, for the sake of upholding the doctrine of sovereign self-rule, we 
should hold that the Volenti maxim does not apply to cases where people attempt to consent 
to being treated as though they lack the normative status of personally autonomous beings. 
 While the gladiator case is the one with which I have been concerned in this paper, it 
does seem possible that there are other sorts of cases where enacting the Volenti maxim 
might amount to an abandonment of the doctrine of sovereign self-rule. The key elements to 
look for in such cases would be that the participants are being misused, rather than 
mistreated, that their ability to make choices regarding fulfilling their duties to others is not 
being recognized, and that the surrounding context is such that their treatment does not 
arise out of any acknowledgement of them as the sort of beings who are the appropriate loci 
of rights and duties. While none of these conditions alone are necessary, I think that together 
they are jointly sufficient. If all of them are fulfilled by a particular case, then, in order to 
uphold the doctrine of sovereign self-rule, the Volenti maxim ought not to apply to that case. 
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Accepting these conditions as limiting the Volenti maxim would provide Feinberg with a 
fresh way of evaluating a range of problematic cases, and, insofar as they might lead his 
theory to deliver different verdicts in those cases, would make his theory more amenable to 
those who support personal autonomy but are nevertheless troubled by the thought that 
consent, at least as far as the community is concerned, nullifies all wrongdoing. Ultimately, 
my proposal is meant as a friendly suggestion to Feinberg: it enables him to accommodate 
our intuitions without abandoning the essential tenets of his liberalism. 
 
 
 33 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
Alexander, Larry. “When Are We Rightfully Aggrieved? A Comment on Postema.” Legal  
Theory 11 (2005): 325-32. 
 
Devlin, Patrick. The Enforcement of Morals. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965. 
 
Dubin, Charles L. “Consent in Criminal Law.” In Legal Theory Meets Legal Practice, edited by  
Anne Bayefsky, 239-52. Edmonton, Alberta: Academic Printing and Publishing,  
1988. 
 
Dworkin, Gerald, editor. Morality, Harm, and the Law. Boulder: Westview Press, Inc., 1994. 
 
Dworkin, Ronald. “Rights as Trumps.” In Theories of Rights, edited by J. Waldron, 153-67.  
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984. 
 
Feinberg, Joel. “Harm and Self-Interest.” In Law, Morality, and Society: Essays in Honour of  
H.L.A. Hart, edited by P.M.S. Hacker and J. Raz, 285-308. Oxford: Clarendon Press,  
1977. 
 
Feinberg, Joel. Harm to Others. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984. 
 
Feinberg, Joel. Harm to Self. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986. 
 
Feinberg, Joel. Harmless Wrongdoing. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990. 
 
Feinberg, Joel. “The Nature and Value of Rights.” Journal of Value Inquiry Vol. 4, No. 4  
(1970): 243-257. 
 
Fitzgerald, Patrick. “Consent, Crime and Rationality.” In Legal Theory Meets Legal Practice,  
edited by Anne Bayefsky, 209-21. Edmonton, Alberta: Academic Printing and  
Publishing, 1988. 
 
Gutmann, Amy. “Communitarian Critics of Liberalism.” In Communitarianism and  
Individualism, edited by Shlomo Avineri and Avner De-Shalit, 120-136. Oxford:  
Oxford University Press, 1992. Originally published in Philosophy and Public Affairs  
Vol. 14, No. 3 (1985): 308-22. 
 
Hart, H.L.A. Law, Liberty, and Morality. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1963. 
 
Hohfeld, Wesley. Fundamental Legal Conceptions: as applied in Judicial Reasoning. Edited by W.  
Cook. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1946. 
 
Kleinig, John. “Consent as a Defence in Criminal Law.” Archiv fur Rechts- und  
Sozialphilosophie Vol. LXV, No. 3 (1979): 329-346. 
 
 
 
 
 34 
Kristol, Irving. “Pornography, Obscenity, and the Case for Censorship.” In Morality, Harm,  
and the Law, edited by Gerald Dworkin, 46-49. Boulder: Westview Press, Inc., 1994.  
Originally published in New York Times Magazine (March 28, 1971): 246-247. 
 
Kymlicka, Will. Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University  
Press, 2002. 
 
Mill, John Stuart. On Liberty. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003. 
 
Postema, Gerald. “Collective Evils, Harms, and the Law.” Ethics Vol. 97, No. 2 (Jan 1987):  
414-440. 
 
Postema, Gerald. “In Defense of ‘French Nonsense:’ Fundamental Rights in Constitutional  
Jurisprudence.” In Enlightenment, Rights and Revolution: Essays in Legal and Social  
Philosophy, edited by Neil MacCormick and Zenon Bankowski, 107-133. Aberdeen:  
Aberdeen University Press, 1989. 
 
Postema, Gerald. “Politics is About the Grievance: Feinberg on the Legal Enforcement of  
Morals.” Legal Theory 11 (2005): 293-323. 
 
Raz, Joseph. The Morality of Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988. 
 
Singer, Beth. “Having Rights.” Philosophy and Social Criticism Vol. 11, No. 4 (1986): 391-412. 
 
Tamir, Yael. Liberal Nationalism. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993. 
 
Taylor, Charles. “Atomism.” In Communitarianism and Individualism, edited by Shlomo Avineri  
and Avner De-Shalit, 29-50. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992. Originally  
published in Powers, Possessions and Freedom, edited by Alkis Kontos, 39-61. Toronto:  
University of Toronto Press, 1979. 
 
Taylor, Charles. Reconciling the Solitudes: Essays on Canadian Federalism and Nationalism. Montreal  
& Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1993. 
 
Tomasi, John. Liberalism Beyond Justice: Citizens, Society, and the Boundaries of Political Theory.  
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001. 
